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Abstract 
This paper investigates the way in which parental human capital investment in young 
co-resident children varies with their own consumption. It is motivated by rejection of 
parental altruism in recent research, the unexpectedly small effects of parental income 
on child outcomes found in a number of studies, and the claim in several historical 
and anthropological studies of child labour that parents are selfish. Models of child 
labour and human capital typically assume parental altruism and, in many cases, this 
assumption is critical to the model. The results suggest that, in the preference function 
of parents, child human capital is a normal good and that child labour is a bad, 
consistent with altruism.  
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1    Introduction 
Models of educational investment in children and models of child labour typically 
assume parent altruism (e.g. Becker and Tomes 1986, Dessy and Pallage 2001, Basu 
and Van 1998, Baland and Robinson 2000). This assumption can be critical. For 
example, in the influential paper of Basu and Van (1998) on the economics of child 
labour, a strong altruism assumption is essential to the result that the labour market 
may exhibit multiple equilibria, and the policy analysis that follows depends upon 
this.  
In his survey of theories of intrahousehold allocation, Behrman (1997: p.132) 
states that all of the conclusions flowing from Becker and Tomes (1986), which, he 
argues, has shaped the way economists think about intrahousehold allocation and 
human capital investment, “depend upon the assumption that parents devote “enough” 
resources to their children. Yet, parents who are insufficiently wealthy or 
insufficiently altruistic fail to provide their children with the socially efficient wealth-
maximising level of human resources..”. While many previous studies have argued 
that sub-optimal levels of human capital investment can be explained by credit 
constraints (e.g. Loury 1981, Parish and Willis 1993, Ranjan 2001, Baland and 
Robinson 2000, Edmonds 2003), much less attention has been directed, in this 
context, at the role of parental preferences (though see Banerjee 2003, for a theoretical 
discussion).
1  
                                                 
* The first draft of this paper was circulated in September 2001. I am grateful to Martin 
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Bristol (Nov 2001), Cambridge (Sep 2001), Sussex/IDS (Nov 2001), the Indian Statistical 
Institute in Delhi (Dec 2001), and the Centre for Applied Microeconomics in Copenhagen 
(June 2004). 
1 Rogers and Swinnerton (2003) cite the historical research of Parsons and Goldin (1989) and 
an earlier version of this paper (Bhalotra 2001) as being the only available empirical studies 
that attempt to examine parental altruism in the context of child labour and schooling.  
  2  In a largely unnoticed challenge to the prevalent assumption in the human 
capital literature, numerous historical and anthropological studies of child labour have 
cast parents as selfish, and sending their children to work to further their own 
consumption, or to pay off their debts.
2 Potentially consistent with this, micro-
econometric research has often found surprisingly small effects of parental income on 
child labour (see Rogers and Swinnerton (2004), Bhalotra and Tzannatos (2003), 
Brown et al (2003), for example) and schooling (e.g. Behrman and Knowles 1999). 
Small effects of parental income on child outcomes have been also been noted in 
other contexts (e.g., Shea 2000, Mayer 1997, Currie 1995, Haveman and Wolfe 1995: 
p.1856). Moreover, direct tests of intergenerational altruism have tended to reject it 
(see Cox and Rank 1992, Altonji et al 1992, 1997, Hayashi 1995). 
Some of the empirical results suggesting parental selfishness may simply 
reflect specification errors, or be consistent with altruism upon closer inspection. 
However, if correct, they have important implications for policy design. Evidence of 
limited parental altruism would lend weight to legislative interventions such as bans 
on child labour and compulsory schooling laws, and it would challenge the efficacy of 
cash transfer programmes directed at children. Most OECD countries offer child 
benefits, the within-household allocation of which has generated recent research (e.g. 
Blow, Walker and Zhu 2004, Edmonds 2002, Kooreman 2000). In an analysis of 
educational progression in France, Maurin (2002) concludes that “policy decisions 
that increase income transfers to relatively poor families have a potentially very large 
impact on children’s early performance at school”. Cash transfer programmes are also 
increasingly popular amongst interventions conducted by governments and 
international organizations in developing countries, many of which carry the objective 
of increasing school attendance and reducing child labour (e.g., the Food for 
Education Program in Bangladesh, Progresa in Mexico, Bolsa Escola in Brazil). 
When parents decide how much to spend on the human capital of their 
children, the rewards to which accrue to the child over a long horizon, there is an 
evident agency issue (e.g. Baland and Robinson 2000). Might cash transfers targeted 
at child schooling but offered to parents be subject to “leakages”, with parental 
                                                 
2 Among economic historians, see Parsons and Goldin (1989) and Nardinelli (1990, p. 94), 
with reference to nineteenth century USA and England respectively. See Khan (2001) for 
anthropological work on contemporary Sialkot in Pakistan; see Burra (1995), Bhatty (1998) 
and Gupta (2000) for field-based research that is consistent with parental selfishness in India; 
and Fyfe (1989, p.76). 
  3consumption (or leisure) claiming part of the benefit? The fact that cash transfer 
programmes like Progresa are conditional on (monitored) school attendance and 
attendance at health clinics suggests that this concern is recognized “on the field” (see 
Becker 1999). That it is not entirely implausible is born out by the finding in Blow, 
Walker and Zhu (2004) that child benefit in the UK is spent disproportionately on 
alcohol. 
This paper delivers estimates of how income is allocated within the household 
between child human capital (or labour) and adult consumption. In the altruistic 
model, this corresponds to the relative weight that parents place on child human 
capital (or labour). Estimates of the ratio of income effects on child and parent 
consumption flow directly from m-demands, which involve conditioning on the level 
of a reference good rather than on total expenditure (details in section 3.3). M-
demands may have an advantage over standard demand functions if the reference 
good is measured with less error, and they are especially useful when data on total 
expenditure are unavailable (see Browning 1998). Since we do have data on total 
expenditure, the m-demand estimates are compared with estimates of the 
corresponding pair of Marshallian demands. An advantage of looking, in this way, at 
the ratio of income effects on child and adult consumption, rather than directly at the 
income effect on the child outcome, is that it nets out considerations of income 
uncertainty and lumpiness in expenditure (see Kooreman 2000, footnote 5 for 
example). 
Note that the incidence of child labour does not, by itself, indicate that parents 
are not altruistic. For example, child labour can arise because of coordination failures 
(Dessy and Pallage 2001) or because of imperfect labour and land markets (Bhalotra 
and Heady 2004). However, the hypothesis that parents are selfish or exploitative in 
the sense that they benefit from sending children to work can be rejected if we find 
that moving a child into work is associated with a decrease in the consumption (or 
leisure) of parents. Similarly, the null of parental egoism can be rejected if increases 
in income are shared between increases in child schooling and adult consumption (or 
leisure). 
The existing literature on intergenerational altruism has focused on gifts and 
bequests within the extended family. This paper contributes to research on altruism by 
shifting attention to human capital investment in minors. Moreover, while the 
previous literature characterises altruism as income pooling, this paper adopts the 
  4standard Beckerian characterization of parental altruism, remaining agnostic on the 
question of whether incomes are pooled across the generations once the children have 
grown up. The focus here is on whether low levels of human capital investment in 
children in developing countries can be attributed to absent parental altruism. Whether 
or not children reciprocate when they are older is not of direct interest since, at the 
time when parents are making investment decisions, they cannot contract their 
children to make these return transfers (see Baland and Robinson (2000), where the 
impossibility of intergenerational contracting is highlighted in a model of child 
labour; also see section 3.2). The contribution of this paper to research on education 
and child labour is primarily to highlight the role of parental altruism. Previous 
research in economics has typically assumed parental altruism and interpreted the 
effect of parental income on child human capital outcomes as an indicator of credit 
constraints. It is argued here that one could equally assume credit constraints and 
interpret income effects in terms of altruism (see section 3.4). 
The data are a household survey for rural Pakistan, a poor society in which 
human capital investment in children is low and poverty and market imperfections 
impact most households. The main result in the paper is that school participation 
exhibits a positive covariance with adult consumption in the household, while 
increases in child labour are associated with a cutting back of adult consumption. 
There is no support for the view that parental exploitation drives child labour: the 
estimates suggest that incomes are pooled when children work and that, parents, as 
decision-makers, treat child leisure and schooling as normal goods. Specifically, a 
10% increase in adult clothing expenditure is associated with about a 6 percent point 
increase in the proportion of children in the household that attend school, or a 3 
percent point decrease in the proportion of children in work.  
The significance of the adult expenditure coefficient is subject to tests that 
yield the correct rejection probabilities even when the instruments are weak (Moreira 
2002). The findings persist in a number of alternative specifications, including one in 
which adult labour is held constant. Pairs of Marshallian demands provide point 
estimates that are larger but not significantly different from the m-demand estimates. 
The results are also robust to changes in functional form. The main specification 
involves adult clothing. As a further robustness check, alternative specifications are 
estimated in which other categories of adult consumption constitute the reference 
good in the m-demand (see section 3.3). The main conclusions persist except for one 
  5case which, it is argued, suggests that unobservables in the equations for child labour 
and smoking are correlated (see section 5.2).  
Section 2 elaborates the contributions of this paper in relation to previous 
research. The prediction of the altruistic model that is investigated is defined in 
section 3, which also discusses the competing hypothesis of exchange. Section 4 
describes the data and estimation issues. The main results are presented in section 5. 
Section 6 investigates robustness to alternative specifications, and section 7 
concludes. 
 
2   Relation to Previous Research 
The paper contributes to the literature in the areas of inter-generational altruism, child 
labour and human capital, and cash transfers. Consider each in turn. Generations are 
linked by gifts and bequests, and by human capital investment (e.g. Ermisch 2003). 
Previous research on intergenerational altruism has focused on the former, using data 
on parents and adult children (for a survey, see Laitner 1997). This paper shifts the 
focus to the latter, and therefore to minor children.
3 Since childhood is the time when 
critical investments in health and education are made that have lasting and often 
irreversible effects on later life-chances, this is an important shift. It is especially 
relevant in developing countries, where the more limited role of the state creates 
greater room for parental resources and preferences to influence the level of 
investment in children. A further distinction of this paper from previous research is 
that it tests a weaker definition of altruism. Previous research on intergenerational 
altruism has effectively tested for income pooling in the extended family (e.g. Altonji 
et al 1992, 1997, Hayashi 1995).
4 As this has quite consistently been rejected, it is 
pertinent to test the weaker condition of positive transfers to minors who typically 
have no income of their own, or a smaller income.  
As discussed above, previous research on child labour and human capital has 
tended to assume parent altruism, even as small income effects, together with research 
                                                 
3 The first version of this  paper (Bhalotra 2001) is the first to link the literature on 
intergenerational transfers to the literature on investment in human capital. This relation is 
further discussed in Rogers and Swinnerton (2003, 2004). 
4 It is straightforward to show that the income transfer derivative restriction investigated in, 
for example, Altonji et al 1997, holds only if income pooling holds. For an explicit account, 
see Bhalotra (2004). Although it is clear in the wider literature that altruism does not imply 
income pooling and that income pooling can hold in the absence of altruism, available tests of 
intergenerational altruism are effectively tests of income pooling. 
  6in anthropology and economic history appear to challenge it. Some existing research 
has investigated whether, when children work, incomes are pooled.
5 This research is 
motivated by the idea that income-shares of family members are associated with 
bargaining power and therefore with resource claims. But the prior question is: Why 
do children work? To understand this, it is relevant to consider whether parents are 
altruistic in the sense that they will cut back their own above-subsistence consumption 
or leisure in order to avoid the child working. This paper is the first to investigate this 
question. 
Previous research on cash transfers has also assumed altruism (e.g. Edmonds 
2004, Attanasio and Lechene 2002), although Duflo (2003) finds evidence consistent 
with grandmothers being altruistic while grandfathers are not. The intrahousehold 
allocation of cash transfers has been investigated, but with a view to identifying any 
labeling effects (Kooreman 2000, Edmonds 2002, Blow et al 2004). The data used in 
this paper do not contain information on a cash transfer. To the extent that there are 
labeling effects whereby transfers for children are spent disproportionately on 
children, the estimates in this paper will understate altruism. In this case, rejection of 
parental egoism (which is the null) is robust to the absence of data on cash transfers. 
 
3    An Analytical Framework  
The prediction of the altruistic model that is tested is set out in section 3.1, where it is 
shown to flow from a general class of models in the literature. Section 3.2 argues that 
the competing hypothesis that parental human capital investments in children are 
motivated by anticipation of reciprocal transfers in old age is not compelling and, 
more important, not relevant to the objectives of this paper. M-demands are 
introduced in section 3.3 as a useful way of estimating the relationship of interest, and 
section 3.4 shows that this is equivalent to estimating the marginal effect of income on 
the child outcome, relative to the marginal effect of income on adult consumption. 
Section 3.5 points out that previous research has tended to interpret income effects on 
schooling or child labour as indicating credit constraints, (implicitly) maintaining the 
assumption of parental altruism. It is argued that one could equally maintain the 
assumption that credit constraints bind and interpret absent income effects in terms of 
(absent) altruism.  
                                                 
5 See Moehling 2004, Bhalotra and Attfield 1998. This question is also investigated in section 
  73.1    The hypothesis 
As in previous research on inter-generational altruism, parents are treated as a unit. In 
line with the literature on human capital and child labour, it is assumed that parents 
decide on the allocation of resources to minor children (e.g. Dessy and Pallage 2001, 
Baland and Robinson 2000). This is plausible a priori in the context of children under 
15 in rural South Asia, and supported by evidence from anthropological and other 
studies that, when they work, children hand over their earnings to their parents.
6 The 
implied assumption that income pooling holds for families with working children is 
nevertheless investigated in section 6 below, and confirmed. This paper is agnostic on 
the question of income pooling when children have grown up to form their own 
households. As discussed above, this is precisely the question investigated in previous 
research, where the focus has been on adult children living independently of their 
parents (e.g. Altonji et al 1997).  
The empirical analysis in this paper is consistent with the class of models that 
is commonly analysed in the theoretical literature on child labour and human capital. 
It investigates the assumption of parental altruism that they all rely upon, that has not 
directly been investigated, and that section 1 argues is both controversial and 
important to policy design.  
Consider the seminal paper on the economics of child labour by Basu and Van 
(1998). This sets out a simple single-period model in which a critical assumption is 
that parents are altruistic and only send their children to work if this is essential to the 
survival needs of the household. Clearly, we would expect no above-subsistence 
consumption in such households. This paper tests a prediction of a more general 
model of parental altruism, in which parents attach a positive weight to child 
schooling and a negative weight to child labour. The prediction investigated is that 
above-subsistence adult consumption is lower in households with working children, 
and higher in households with school-going children. The idea is that altruistic parents 
will equate the marginal utility of their consumption to the marginal utility of child 
schooling (or to the MU of child leisure, which is higher if children work).  
                                                                                                                                            
6 below. 
6 See Khan (2001) for Pakistan, Gupta (2000) and Burra (1995) for India, and the Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (1996, Table 5.12, p.54) for Bangladesh. For several anecdotes 
suggesting parental power, see Fyfe (1989, pp.73-76). See Gupta (2000) for a theoretical 
model of child labour that assumes parental control. 
  8More recent theoretical papers on child labour specify 2-period models with 
parental altruism.
7 In these models, child labour is assumed to reduce schooling 
attainment and, thereby, future earnings capacity.
8 In period 1, there is a parent and a 
(minor) child and the parent decides how much human capital to endow the minor 
with, how much to consume, and how much to save.
9 In period 2, the child is an adult 
who earns an income that depends upon her human capital, and she potentially makes 
a transfer to her (elderly) parent. Period 2 also sees parents decide how much to 
consume and how much to leave the child in bequests. The first order conditions of 
the altruistic model set out in these papers show that the level of human capital 
investment in period 1 will co-vary with the level of parental consumption in period 1. 
This is the condition tested in this paper. If, instead, parents were selfish and did not 
care about child utility (and also did not derive a “warm glow” directly from the level 
of human capital of their children) then additional income would be spent on parental 
consumption (assuming this is normal) without necessarily incrementing the level of 
human capital of children in the household (the case of a horizontal income expansion 
path). Similarly, if parental utility depends upon child utility, or if child labour 
directly generates disutility for the parent, the FOCs will imply a negative relation of 
child labour and parental consumption. Any increment in income will be used to 
simultaneously buy more parental consumption and reduce child labour (in line with 
the MRS condition). This condition is also tested. 
 
                                                 
7 See Baland and Robinson (BR) 2000, and extensions of this model by Rogers and 
Swinnerton (RS) 2004, Bommier and Dubois (BD) 2003 and Fitzsimons (F) 2003. These 
papers are concerned with whether the level of child labour in the economy is inefficiently 
high, and with how this level responds to credit market imperfections and problems of 
intergenerational contracting (BR), the level of parental income (RS), parental-income risk 
(F), or whether or not child labour brings disutility to the child in period-1 (BD). 
8 These are, therefore, effectively models of human capital investment. In the traditional 
model of human capital investment (e.g. Becker and Tomes 1986), altruistic parents make 
efficient human capital investments in their children, and then make transfers (gifts and 
bequests) to them according to their incomes and preferences. Although, in this simple case, 
there is no effect of parental income on education, income effects can be shown to arise in 
more general models of the sort discussed here. Empirical research concerned with the fact 
that educational investment, especially in developing countries, is lower than the efficient 
level has tended to focus on the problem of credit constraints (e.g. Edmonds 2004). The 
assumption of altruism seems unquestioned, with the exception of Kochar (1999). 
9 The labour supply of parents is assumed exogenous in these models. This assumption is 
relaxed in the empirical analysis in this paper.   





θ , where A refers to (above-subsistence) adult consumption, H 
refers to child human capital (schooling), L is child labour, and C refers to all other 
consumption, assumed to be shared. To the extent that child labour reduces schooling, 
this is reflected in H. The appearance of L in the utility function allows for a separate 
role for child leisure, or for parents to derive disutility from seeing their children work 
(as in Bommier and Dubois 2003). It follows directly from the standard optimization 
programme that ∂ H/∂ A=(β /α )(pA/pH)>0, where pA, pH are prices of A and H. Similarly, 
∂ L/∂ A<0.
10 The estimates will, of course, confirm whether or not child labour is a 
“bad”, and to what extent child labour and schooling are substitutes. Under the null of 
egoistic parents, when neither of H  and  L appear in the parental utility function, 
∂ H/∂ A=0 and, since child labour augments income, ∂ L/∂ A≥ 0.
 11   
3.2    Altruism vs exchange motives 
The previous section describes a testable prediction of the altruistic model. Finding 
that the data satisfy that prediction is, as always, potentially consistent with other 
hypotheses. The main competing hypothesis here is that of exchange: parents may 
send their children to school rather than to work not because they are altruistic but 
because they expect that a higher level of investment in child human capital in period-
1 will bring them higher return transfers in period-2 (e.g. Nugent 1985, Cox 1987, 
Lillard and Willis 1997).  
The exchange motive is undermined by the fact that it is difficult for parents to 
enforce repayment from children, especially over a long horizon (e.g. Baland and 
                                                 
10 For this simple illustration, I have written parental preferences as depending directly on the 
level of human capital of the child in period-1. This is sometimes referred to as the warm-
glow formulation (e.g. Banerjee 2003). The testable predictions that we are concerned with in 
this paper are unchanged if, instead, the caring representation of preferences (e.g. 
Bourguignon et al 1994) is used, in which parent utility depends upon child utility, as long as 
child utility is increasing in H and decreasing in L. 
11 The first version of this paper sets out a more general model that includes the consumption 
and labour supplies of parent and child (Bhalotra 2001). This paper investigates how adult 
consumption varies with child labour but we could equally investigate how adult labour varies 
with child labour (for which see Bhalotra 2002). Further to discussion with me following my 
presentation of this paper at the AEA (Atlanta) and the LSE, Marco Manacorda has, in a 
recent working paper, applied the altruism test suggested in this paper to analyse the response 
of parental labour to child labour in twentieth century America. His results corroborate those 
of this paper. 
  10Robinson 2000, Fitzsimmons 2003).
12 Moreover, the evidence on the exchange 
motive is not compelling. Although positive evidence is reported in Lillard and Willis 
(1997) and Lucas and Stark (1995), Kochar (2000), Fitzsimons (2003) and Pal (2004) 
find little support for the hypothesis that the probability or amount of transfers 
received by elderly parents is increasing in the level of education of their children. 
The distinction between altruism and exchange may, further, be seen as inherently 
impossible to make. Thus, even when the child’s utility is an argument in the parental 
utility function, parents are maximizing their own utility and, by that criterion, may be 
regarded as selfish, not altruistic (Becker 1981, p. 2). Becker clarifies that the 
definition of altruism that he proposes is one that is relevant to behaviour rather than 
to the more philosophical question of what “really” motivates people. This is also the 
case in this paper. In the analysis, “altruism” denotes a positive weight attached to 
sending a child to school (or a negative weight attached to putting a child in work) in 
the current period for whatever reason. The deeper motivation may be argued to be 
largely irrelevant if the motivating question relates to the extent to which additional 
income in the hands of parents (which may be provided by a cash transfer) translates 
into child human capital.
13,14  
3.3    M-Demands  
The first order conditions of the altruistic model discussed in section 3.1 can be solved 
to write child human capital, H, and child labour, L, as functions of a category of adult 
consumption, Aj, and all prices (p): 
                                                 
12 Fitzsimons emphasizes that even where there are ad hoc transfers from child to parent in 
period 2, what is important is that, when parents are making human capital decisions in period 
1, they know that reciprocity is not enforceable. Although Lopez-Calva and Miyamoto (2004) 
conjecture that social norms may be strong enough for children to compensate parents in their 
old age, Becker and Murphy (1988) conjecture the opposite. 
13 The issue of identifying which of altruism and exchange motives operate at the margin 
relates to a somewhat generic problem of inferring preferences from expenditure data. It 
arises, for example, in studies of intra-household allocation that are motivated to test for 
“discrimination” against girls (e.g. Deaton 1989, Ahmad and Morduch 1993). These studies 
do not permit identification of whether observed effects of gender reflect preference weights, 
or whether they reflect differential market incentives such as arise if boys earn more on the 
labour market than girls with the same level of human capital (see Behrman 1997: section 
3.3.2).  
14 A similar argument has been made in previous policy-motivated empirical research. For 
example, in their analysis of whether people with schooling make more efficient use of 
information on contraceptives, Rosenzweig and Schultz (1989: p.458) acknowledge the 
possibility that schooling levels may merely proxy pre-existing skills (“ability”), but argue 
that this conceptual distinction is irrelevant to the pragmatic issue of targeting of public 
information programs on contraception.  
  11 
(1a)   H = fH (p, Aj) 
(1b)   L = fL (p, Aj) 
 
These are m-demands which, with H (or L) and Aj set at their optimal values, describe 
the indifference curve between them. M-demands are expressed as a function of prices 
and the quantity of a reference good, rather than total expenditure (see Browning 
1998). In this case, Aj has been cast as the reference good.
15 A condition on the choice 
of reference good is that it be normal; this is established for the data used here 
(section 3.2). M-demands have been used, implicitly or explicitly, in Heckman 
(1974b), Altonji (1986), Meghir and Weber (1996) and Attanasio and MaCurdy 
(1997). For example, Heckman estimates indifference curves rather than the more 
conventional labour supply curves, to study the effect of child-care on women’s work. 
Browning (1998) investigates the theoretical underpinnings of m-demands, and 
proposes them as useful in maximising the preference information that can be 
recovered from the data when information on total expenditure is unavailable.
16  
In the current context, m-demands offer a natural estimating framework since 
they directly deliver estimates of the parameter of interest, ∂ H/∂ Aj in (1a) and ∂ L/∂ Aj 
in (1b). Total expenditure is available in the data used so, for comparison, these 
parameters are also derived from pairs of Marshallian demands (section 3.4 below). 
As discussed in section 1, estimation of m-demands or else pairs of Marshallian 
demands is useful compared with estimation of single Marshallian demands because 
comparison of the ways in which child and adult expenditures vary nets out 
considerations of income uncertainty and lumpiness in expenditure (see Kooreman 
2000, footnote 5 for example). To the extent that expenditures on sub-aggregates of 
                                                 
15 The “m” arises because m-demands can be derived from the marginal rate of substitution 
condition. It has no relation to the fact that total expenditure is denoted m below. Closed form 
m-demands are obtainable from the first order conditions only for a particular class of utility 
functions (like the LES). However, the fact that we do not have to simultaneously solve for 
the budget constraint makes this approach more widely applicable than it is for Marshallian 
demands (Browning 1998). 
16 Another advantage of m-demands, argued by Browning, is that it is not necessary to 
observe all quantities in order to model the demand for a subset of goods. In contrast, the 
usual practice of modeling demands as Marshallian involves invoking (often implausible) 
separability assumptions.  
  12consumption are measured with less error than total expenditure, m-demands may 
produce more robust estimates than Marshallian demands.
17 
3.4    Ratio of marginal income effects 
This sub-section shows that the paramaeter of interest, ∂ H/∂ Aj is simply the ratio of 
the marginal income effects on H and on Aj (and similarly for ∂ L/∂ Aj). It follows 
Browning (1998), except that Browning looks at different categories of household 
expenditure rather than at expenditure on adults and children. The pair of Marshallian 
demands for human capital and adult consumption are: 
 
(2)   H = H (p, m) 
(3)   Aj = Aj (p, m) 
 
where m is total household expenditure and p is the price vector. As long as (3) is 
monotonic, guaranteed by Aj being normal through the range of incomes, it can be 
inverted to get m = m(p, Aj). Substituting this in (2) gives: 
 
(4) H = H
 (p, m(p, Aj)) = f(p, Aj) 
 
which is nothing but (1), the m-demand for human capital. This formulation clarifies 
that income contains no additional information once the level of the reference good is 
held constant. Studying (4) also reveals that the coefficient of interest is simply the 
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If  Aj is normal, the denominator of the final term in (5) is positive. Thus 
investigating the prediction of the altruistic model that ∂ H/∂ Aj>0 boils down to 
                                                 
17 Errors creep into the calculation of total expenditure through imputation of the value of 
home-produced consumption, consumption of wages in kind, gifts, remittances, and any 
public transfers. In addition, there are fundamental difficulties in incorporating into estimates 
of total expenditure, the value of durables and leisure. Recognising the importance of 
measurement error in expenditure (or income) is potentially important to interpretation of 
previous studies of child welfare. Given that conventional measurement error in a variable 
biases its coefficient towards zero, the finding that income effects on child outcomes are 
sometimes absent or surprisingly small (see section 1) may be spurious.  
  13finding out if ∂ H/∂ m>0, or if child human capital is normal (and similarly when 
considering L rather than H, except for a sign reversal).
18, 19  
3.5    Interpretation of income effects 
Popular discussion of the size of the effect of parental income on child outcomes 
tends to neglect the fact that it contains information about altruism. This is surprising 
in view of the consistent rejection of altruism in the handful of studies that have 
directly investigated it (see section 1, 2). The reason is, likely, that the starting point is 
typically a Beckerian model in which altruism is assumed (see Laitner 1997, for 
example). As always, any empirical test based on such a model is then a test not only 
of the phenomenon of interest but also of the assumption of altruism.  
For example, using the South African pension reform as a source of exogenous 
variation in income, Edmonds (2004) finds that the increase in income in eligible 
households resulted in a decline in child labour and an increase in school enrolment in 
these households. He interprets this as indicating that these households were credit 
constrained. A further interpretation of the result, which is not discussed, is that 
grandparents are, in that setting, altruistic. This is especially relevant if we consider 
the results of a similar analysis of the South African pension by Duflo (2003). She 
finds that, when the pension recipient is a woman, then grand-daughters exhibit better 
health. However, she also finds only small effects on grandsons, and no significant 
effect on the health of boys or girls when the pension recipient is a man. While it is 
difficult to see how market imperfections alone would produce these differential 
results, they are amenable to the interpretation that grandmothers are more altruistic 
than grandfathers, and more so towards girls. Indeed, the further finding that it is 
maternal grandmothers that are altruistic is, in view of paternity uncertainty, 
supportive of a biological basis for altruism. 
Regarding the tendency to associate income effects on human capital 
investment with credit constraints, note also that effects of family wealth and parental 
                                                 
18 The test has power against most relevant alternatives except for the one where there is no 
income effect on the child good as would be the case, for example, if preferences were quasi-
linear (e.g. U=Aj+v(H)). I am grateful to Andrew Foster for pointing this out. 
19 Following my presentation of an earlier version of this paper (available as Bhalotra 2001) at 
Bristol, and discussion with me, Chris Schluter has, in work in progress, used the core ideas in 
this paper to perform a test for positive marginal income effects on child clothing using data 
on the Progresa cash transfer. Like Bhalotra 2001, he uses expenditure on child clothing. My 
results for child clothing are now in a companion paper, Bhalotra 2004. Both papers find 
evidence consistent with altruism. 
  14preferences on the level of educational investment can arise even with perfect capital 
markets if there is symbolic consumption of that investment – that is, if parents get 
positive utility in the current period from their child attending school (see Banerjee 
2003). 
 
4    The Data  
4.1    Data and measurement 
The data refer to 2400 rural households that contain 18382 individuals interviewed for 
the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS) conducted by the World Bank in 
conjunction with the Government in 1991. Pakistan has very low levels of school 
enrollment, even in comparison with other low-income countries, and its child 
workforce participation rates are among the highest in the world (ILO, 1996b). The 
dependent variable in the m-demands is, alternatively, the proportion of children in 
the household that attend school (H), and that engage in work that produces a 
marketable produce (L).
20 Both H and L are investigated since they are not exactly 
inverse. A substantial fraction of children are neither in school nor in work, and some 
children combine school and work (see Bhalotra 2003 for details). Since employment 
questions in the survey are put only to individuals that are 10 years or older, the 
sample is restricted to households that contain at least one 10-14 year old. Although 
information on school attendance is available for children 5 years and older, the 
analysis of schooling is restricted to the 10-14 age group to permit direct comparison 
with the estimates for child labour.  
The adult expenditures (Aj) analysed are on adult clothing and footwear 
(henceforth “adult clothing”, A1), tea and coffee (A2) and tobacco (A3).
21 Expenditure 
on each of the adult items is quite small (see Table 1), and measurement error is more 
problematic when the true quantities are small. For this reason, results are also 
reported for the aggregate of the three goods, which will be referred to as A4. It 
remains useful to consider A1, A2 and A3 separately both because using multiple adult 
goods increases the power of the test, and because the test is then not dominated by 
                                                 
20 This is the ILO definition of work. It includes explicitly waged work and unpaid work on 
household-run farms and enterprises. Individuals are classified as participating in work if they 
report having worked at least one hour in the week preceding the survey. 
21 Alcohol expenditure is unavailable given that alcohol is prohibited in Pakistan. While we 
cannot rule out the possibility that under-15s consume some tea or coffee, it is sufficient for 
our purposes that tea and coffee are predominantly consumed by adults. 
  15properties peculiar to the individual goods. For example, tobacco is potentially 
addictive and is a predominantly male good. Neither of these considerations applies to 
expenditure on adult clothing. All adult expenditures are normalized upon the number 
of adults in the household, with additional regressors describing the age-gender 
composition of the household included to allow for any scale economies.
22  
Demographic variables that reflect observed heterogeneity between 
households appear additively in the specification. The logarithm of household size is 
included together with the proportions of household members in an exhaustive set of 
age-gender categories (under-10, 10-14, 15-24, 25-59 and 60-plus). Other fairly 
conventional controls for observed heterogeneity in equations for education or child 
labour that are included are the years of schooling of the mother and father, gender 
and the religion of the head of household, an indicator for whether the household 
owns land, a measure of the size of the plot (zero if no land is owned), indicators for 
land tenancy arrangements (whether renting or sharecropping land), and an indicator 
for whether the household owns an enterprise. Wage rates for adults and children are 
obtained from community level questionnaires in which village leaders are asked what 
the going wage for agricultural activity is for adults and children.
23 Province dummies 
are included to account for spatial variation in prices. Indicator variables for the 
presence of a primary, middle and secondary school in the community are also 
included in the model, and these may be thought of as proxies for the price of 
schooling. Some variations on this specification are explored in section 6. 
4.2    Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 presents relevant expenditure shares, work and school participation rates, and 
elasticities of these with respect to household living standards. Together, expenditures 
on the “adult goods aggregate”, A4, comprises 8.2% of the budget. The expenditure 
share of tobacco and tea & coffee, at 3.8%, slightly exceeds the expenditure share of 
                                                 
22 As it is not possible to assign expenditures to parents, as opposed to other adults, the 
investigation pertains to all-adults and all-children in the household. South Asian households 
typically consist of closely related people, in contrast to southern African households in which 
fostering is common.  
23 The child wage is missing for 22 of 151 clusters and the male wage for 3. Since a missing 
value for a community translates to missing values for every household in it (resulting in 
1.6% of adult and 14.4% of child wage rates missing at the household level), missing values 
were imputed using other community level information such as whether there is a market, a 
shop, a post office, electricity, gas, and a bus running through the village. The imputation 
involves generating a predicted value from the best available subset of these data (see Little 
and Rubin, 1987). 
  16education (ignoring the opportunity cost of education, of course), which is 3.5%. 
Health is a luxury, and education almost so. The average percentage of children (age 
10-14) in the household that participate in work and school is 32% and 52% 
respectively. 41% of households have at least one child in work and 63% have at least 
one child in school. A 10% increase in total expenditure per capita is associated with a 
2.5% increase in the proportion of children in the household that attend school. In the 
simple unconditional formulation used here, the expenditure elasticities for child 
labour and schooling turn out to be approximately equal, with opposite signs. The 
opposite signs confirm that child labour is, overall, a “bad”, be there some positive 
benefits to accumulating work experience. The reported elasticities confirm normality 
for the adult goods, which is required for them to be cast as reference goods in the m-
demands (see section 3.2). In the case of tobacco, only 70% of households report 
positive expenditure. Since normality can only be defended within this group, the 
estimated model is for this sub-group.  
Let us ask the raw data the question of interest: Is expenditure on adult 
consumption lower, on average, in households with at least one working child than in 
households with none? The results are striking (see Table 2, panel 1). Significantly 
more is spent on tobacco and tea & coffee in households with working children 
although less is spent on adult clothing. Panel 2 reports similar tests for school 
participation. Expenditure on adult clothing is again consistent with altruism, while 
expenditure on tobacco and on tea & coffee is invariant to whether or not children are 
in school, which is consistent with parental egoism. These are, of course, only 
unconditional correlations. More conclusive results are sought from the more formal 
econometric analysis to follow.  
4.3    Identification and estimation 
The estimated m-demands are  
 
(6a) H = λ jAj + δ HZ + e 
(6b) L = φ jAj + δ LZ + u 
 
where household-level subscripts are omitted to avoid clutter, H denotes schooling, L 
denotes child labour, Aj is a category of adult expenditure, j=1,..4,  Z are control 
  17variables detailed above, and the coefficients of interest are λ j=β /α j and ϕ j=γ /α j, 
where α j is the preference weight on the adult good, j (see section 3.1).  
In general, the reference good in an m-demand is endogenous just as, in a 
Marshallian demand function, total expenditure is endogenous (e.g., Deaton 1985, 
Browning 1998).
24 This paper follows Browning (1998) in using a polynomial (a 
cubic) in household income to instrument Aj. In an m-demand, income should not 
affect consumption given the level of the reference good (see section 3.3). Previous 
studies estimating Marshallian demands similarly use income as an instrument for 
expenditure (Browning 1998: section 6.2, Blundell et al 1998, Browning and 
Chiappori 1998). The argument is that income is correlated with expenditure but 
uncorrelated with infrequency of purchase and with measurement error in expenditure 
(e.g. Keen 1986).
25 To investigate whether the IV strategy is robust to non-
separability of adult leisure and child consumption, estimates conditional on adult 
labour supply are also obtained (section 6). The problem is that, if parents who have a 
taste for expenditure on children work harder then the error in the child expenditure 
equation will be correlated with household income, an issue that is often ignored.  
Estimation is initially by the two-step efficient generalised method of 
moments estimator (GMM). This is more efficient than 2SLS and robust to 
heteroskedasticity of unknown form, as well as to arbitrary intra-cluster correlation 
(see Wooldridge 2002: p.193). Since households living in close geographic proximity 
will tend to have some unobservables (like climate, soil or culture) in common, the 
reported standard errors are adjusted to allow for intra-cluster correlations (see Deaton 
(1997), Chapter 2). The Hansen-Sargan J statistic, a version of the Sargan statistic that 
is robust to heteroskedasticity, is presented as a test of the joint null hypothesis that 
the excluded instruments are valid (see Davidson and McKinnon 1993: pp.235-36). In 
no case is this rejected.
26 However, the instruments border on being weak. The F-test 
                                                 
24 There are two sources of correlation between Aj and e (or u) in (6). One arises from using 
the actual rather than predicted level of Aj in (6), and the other from heterogeneity, which 
induces a correlation of the error in the human capital equation with the error in the adult 
expenditure equation.  
25 The assumption that validity of the income instrument rests upon is that the dispersion of 
households over the same budget surface is independent of income. Households can have 
different incomes even if they have the same total expenditure so that, in instrumenting, we 
exploit variations between budget surfaces to identify the m-demand parameters (Browning 
1998). 
26 Since the instruments are the level, the square and the cube of income, a test of 
overidentifying restrictions may be seen a test of functional form. In particular, if the Hansen-
  18of the income instruments in the first stage is 8.65 in the equation that conditions on 
adult clothing. It is larger (and >10) for the adult goods aggregate, and smaller for tea 
& coffee and tobacco (see Table 2, panel 1). When there is a single endogenous 
regressor, a first-stage F statistic smaller than 10 indicates that the instruments are 
weak (Stock & Watson 2002, p.350). In this case, the asymptotic approximations that 
we rely upon when making inferences about coefficients on endogenous variables are 
unsatisfactory (see Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995, Staiger and Stock 1997). 
Following Moreira (2002) and Moreira and Poi (2003), valid tests of the structural 
coefficients estimated by 2SLS and LIML are obtained, together with critical values 
of the Wald and likelihood ratio tests that yield correct rejection probabilities even 
when the instruments are weak. The LIML estimates (Davidson and MacKinnon 
1993, pp. 644-51) are reported in preference to the 2SLS estimates since they are 
known to perform better with weak instruments.
27 Figure 1 shows that the asymptotic 
confidence intervals are similar to the size-correct confidence intervals when the 
dependent variable is schooling. However, when the dependent variable is child 
labour, then for reference goods tea & coffee and tobacco, the asymptotic intervals are 
too narrow. 
 
5   The Results 
5.1    Main Results 
Refer Table 3 (full results available on request). The LIML estimates are generally 
larger than but insignificantly different from the GMM estimates. Comparison of the 
GMM and LIML estimates with their OLS counterparts (panel 3) establishes the 
importance of allowing for endogeneity of the reference good. The OLS coefficients 
are biased downward in every case.
28  
                                                                                                                                            
Sargan test had rejected the instruments, this would be an indication that the benchmark 
model (equation 9) is not linear, and that it should probably include higher-order terms in Aj. 
Functional form was directly investigated (see section 5 below) and the linear model could 
not be rejected. Given linearity of the model, the test is a valid test (has correct size) since the 
three income terms are linearly independent- although it may have low power. 
27 The 2SLS results are very similar. Although the LIML estimates do not allow for clustering 
of standard errors (which the GMM estimates do), the LR test has been shown by Moreira 
(2002) to be robust to departures from normality. 
28 Indeed, OLS estimates of the coefficients on expenditures on tea & coffee and tobacco are 
insignificantly different from zero, while the corresponding GMM relations are negative. This 
suggests that heterogeneity outweighs the income relation and what we are observing in the 
OLS equations is that households that have more children in work are also households that 
  19Consistent with altruism, the coefficient on adult expenditure is positive for 
schooling (H) and negative for child labour (L), with one notable exception, discussed 
below in section 5.2. Child human capital is a normal good, marginal increases in 
income being used to buy more schooling and less child labour at the same time as 
greater adult consumption. Thus, there is little support for the hypothesis of parental 
exploitation discussed in section 1.  
Consider the size of the estimated effects. Refer the estimates in column 1 of 
Table 3 which, using sample averages of expenditures reported in Table 1, imply that 
a 10% increase in expenditure on adult clothing is associated with an increase in the 
proportion of children in school of 0.058 (or six percentage points), and a decrease in 
the proportion of children in work of 0.026 (or three percentage points).
29  
The ratio of the marginal effects of adult expenditure on work and school is, 
as we may expect, similar for the other adult reference goods (see columns 2 and 4 of 
Table 3).
30 This ratio is close to half, suggesting that the “weight” on child schooling 
is about twice that on child labour. This may be explained by the fact that schooling 
and child labour are neither mutually exclusive nor exhaustive categories (section 
4.1). When household income increases, some of the additional school enrolment may 
come from “inactive” children (i.e neither in work nor in school), while some may 
come from children who reduce work-hours but continue to engage in work. Indeed, 
this is exactly what is found in an analysis of the effects of a subsidy offered to 
parents conditional on sending their children to school in Bangladesh (see Ravallion 
and Wodon 2000). In the current sample from Pakistan, as many as 42% of girls and 
14% of boys in the age group 10-14 report inactivity (see Bhalotra 2000). This is a  
phenomenon observed across Africa and Asia (Bhalotra 2003).  
Estimates of Marshallian demands corresponding to the m-demands are 
reported in Table 6 and discussed in section 6 below. They imply that a 10% increase 
in total expenditure per capita is associated with an increase in the proportion of 
                                                                                                                                            
spend more on stimulants. M-demand estimates of Canadian household demands that use an 
identification strategy similar to that used in this paper are reported in Browning (1998). 
There too, heterogeneity outweighs the income relation, producing a significant bias in the 
OLS estimates.  
29 These estimates correspond to (∂ H/∂ logA1) and (∂ L/∂ logA1). The corresponding elasticities, 
(∂ logH/∂ logA1) and (∂ logL/∂ logA1), are estimated, using sample averages of the means of H, 
L and A1 (reported in Table 1), to be 1.11 and -0.74. Neither of these numbers is significantly 
different from unity in absolute terms. 
  20children in school of 0.04 (or four percent points), and a decrease in the proportion in 
work of 0.016 (or two percent points). Notice that the ratio of effects is again close to 
half. Thus Marshallian estimates of the parameter, ∂ H/∂ Aj (or ∂ L/∂ Aj) are similar to 
the m-demand estimates. The fact that the effect of total expenditure (m) on schooling 
is, at 0.04, smaller than the effect of adult expenditure (Aj) on schooling (0.058) is 
unsurprising since the latter is equivalent to the former divided by the effect of total 
expenditure on adult expenditure (see section 3.4, equation 5).     
5.2    Smoking and investment in children 
Amongst the eight coefficients reported in Table 3, there is one anomalous result. 
When the dependent variable is child labour (L) and the reference good is tobacco 
(A3), the GMM estimates show a negative coefficient that is significant at the 10% 
level, but the conditional LR test of Moreira (2002) shows that we cannot reject the 
null that this coefficient is zero (also see Figure 1). So, in this one case, we cannot 
reject parental egoism.  
A special feature of column 3 in Table 3 is that, in order to meet the 
requirement that the reference good is normal (refer section 3.3), the sample of 
households is restricted to the 70% that report positive expenditure on tobacco. We 
cannot conclude that all households with smokers are not altruistic because the same 
restricted sample shows the expected positive association of school attendance with 
tobacco expenditure. It therefore seems that selection into the sample of smoking 
households is correlated with unobservables in the child labour equation (though not 
with unobservables in the  schooling equation). Substantively, this is an interesting 
finding. As it is difficult to find an instrument to correct for this endogeneity, we may 
conclude that tobacco does not satisfy the properties of a good reference good, and the 
main results rest on consideration of the other adult expenditure categories. 
To investigate the tobacco effect further, alternative estimates that use the 
whole sample and incorporate a dummy for smokers to allow for non-linearity at zero 
consumption were obtained (see Table 4). The coefficient on tobacco expenditure is 
now significant (even by the adjusted LR test), and its sign consistent with altruism. 
The dummy is negative in the schooling equation, and positive in the child labour 
equation. Using these estimates, predictions are obtained for the levels of schooling 
                                                                                                                                            
30 In other words, (∂ L/∂ A1)/(∂ H/∂ A1)= -0.006/0.013 and (∂ L/∂ A2)/(∂ H/∂ A2)= -0.027/0.061, so 
(∂ L/∂ H) ≈ -0.5. 
  21and child labour in households that do and do not purchase tobacco. Table 4 shows 
that, on average, after controlling for the level of adult consumption and for 
demographics, child labour is higher and school attendance is lower in households 
with a smoker. This is consistent with the raw data described in section 4.2. Overall, 
these results suggest that children are worse off, on average, in households with a 
smoker. 
 
6    Robustness and Alternative Specifications 
This section considers robustness to model specification and alternative estimators. It 
investigates income pooling when children work, and the robustness of the main 
results to the presence of child labour, and to non-separability of adult labour. It 
allows for endogenous fertility, and for alternative functional forms and alternative 
definitions of the main variables. For parsimony, results displayed in this section 
(Tables 5-7) are for the case where adult clothing is the reference good, and the 
benchmark model is that in column 1 of Table 3. Results using alternative reference 
goods are available on request 
It is assumed here, and in most previous research, that the child has no 
decision-making power in the household (see section 3.1). Yet child labour may 
generate bargaining power (see Moehling 2004, Bhalotra and Attfield 1998). This is 
explored here by modelling expenditure on an assignable child consumption category, 
child clothing, as a function of log total expenditure per capita and the proportion of 
children in the household in work. The latter variable represents the share of income 
contributed by children and is therefore an index of their bargaining power. Under the 
null of income pooling, the coefficient on this variable is zero. Under alternatives such 
as a bargaining model in which working children claim a greater share of resources, 
the coefficient on this variable is positive. Results are in Table 5.
31 The hypothesis of 
a positive coefficient is decisively rejected (by OLS, LIML and GMM estimates). The 
coefficient on the child labour variable is insignificantly different from zero, 
consistent with income pooling. As a further check, the m-demand for schooling was 
estimated on the sample of households in which no child works, and the coefficient 
                                                 
31 Total expenditure is instrumented with a cubic in income (as, for example in Blundell et al 
1998). Additional instruments used to allow for the potential endogeneity of the child labour 
term are the community-level wage rates for children and adults, and indicators for the 
  22∂ H/∂ Aj was not significantly different from that obtained on the full sample. Results 
are in column 1, Table 7. 
Recall that the strategy of using income as an instrument for adult 
consumption in the equation for child labour relies upon assuming separability of 
adult and child labour. While this is quite standard in the literature, it is questionable 
(see Bhalotra 2002). Table 7 shows estimates that condition on adult labour supply, 
first total, and then separating adult males and females. The parameters of interest, 
∂ H/∂ Aj  and  ∂ L/∂ Aj, are not significantly changed. Consistent with altruism, the 
coefficient on adult labour is positive in the child labour equation, and negative in the 
schooling equation. In other words, the data show that child labour is associated with 
a cutting back of adult consumption and leisure (and conversely, in the case of 
schooling). There is no significant difference in the coefficients on adult male and 
female labour supply. In columns 2 & 3, parental labour is assumed exogenous, which 
is common in many theoretical and empirical studies of child labour. In columns 4 & 
5, it is instrumented with the education and age (and interactions thereof) of the 
parents (these are conventional instruments; see, for e.g., Browning and Meghir 
1991). The results are robust to this variation. 
Although economists acknowledge that fertility is a choice variable, this is 
commonly ignored in empirical work, and household size is typically treated as an 
exogenous control variable. A justification of this is to argue that conditioning on size 
produces a short run effect, which may usefully be compared with the corresponding 
long run relation by omitting size (e.g. Deaton 1997: p. 221). Dropping size
32 
produces the results in column 6, Table 7, which show robustness of the key 
coefficient to this change. 
Table 6 reports estimates of Marshallian demands for each of the child 
outcomes (H, L) and adult clothing expenditure, A1 (refer section 3.4). The ratio of the 
income effects from the Marshallian demands produces a point estimate that is larger 
but not significantly different from the corresponding m-demand estimate of the key 
parameter, ∂ H/∂ A1, or ∂ L/∂ A1 (see Notes to Table 6).  
                                                                                                                                            
presence of primary, middle and secondary schools in the community. Tests on the 
instruments are reported in the Tables.  
32 Household size is not the same as fertility. However, in rural households that contain non-
nuclear families, adult membership of the household is likely to be correlated with choices 
over the quantity and quality of children. It is therefore cleaner to allow for the endogeneity of 
total household size.  
  23The square of expenditure on the reference good was included as an additional 
regressor but in no case was it significant. This is backed by the Hansen-Sargan tests 
(see footnote 26). A further specification investigated was that in which all 
expenditures are in logarithms (Table 7). The elasticities derived from these models 
are not significantly different from unity (see Wald tests in Table 7), consistent with a 
Cobb-Douglas specification. The pattern of coefficients in the logarithmic model is 
the same as in the main results.
33 As the dependent variables are proportions, the two-
limit tobit estimator was also used but as similar results were obtained, they are not 
shown. Alternative equations using average hours in work and school instead of the 
proportion of participating children in the household were also estimated, with 
qualitatively similar results (results available on request).  
 
6    Conclusions 
This paper produces estimates of the contemporary sharing of household resources 
between adult consumption and child schooling or, in an alternative specification, 
child labour. It finds that increases in adult consumption are positively associated with 
the proportion of children in the household who attend school, and negatively 
associated with the proportion who are engaged in work. These results obtain in a 
number of specifications of the model, including one in which adult labour supply is 
held constant. The finding that increases in child labour are associated with decreases 
in adult consumption allows us to reject the view prevalent in some previous research 
(see section 1) that parents make child labour choices with a view to their personal 
gain. These results are non-trivial, given previous rejections of altruism (see sections 
1, 2). The paper also presents evidence that, as is commonly assumed, the earnings of 
working children are pooled with other household income. There is some indication 
that, at given living standards, households in which tobacco is consumed are less 
likely to educate their children. The results of this paper are relevant to the vast body 
of research in which parental altruism is axiomatic. They are also relevant to policy 
since, if altruism were weak, then policies that constrain the behaviour of parents- like 
legislative interventions or conditionality in cash transfers- would gain strength.  
 
                                                 
33 The Hansen-Sargan test only just “passes”; see footnote 26. 
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  29Table 1 
Descriptive Statistics 






Budget shares:     
Adult clothing & footwear (A1) 0.043  0.035    0.76 
Tea & coffee (A2) 0.018  0.014    0.60 
Tobacco (A3) 0.020  0.028    0.43 
Adult expend (A4=A1+ A2+ A3) 0.082  0.051    0.68 
Child clothing & footwear (C)  0.029  0.024   0.79 
      
Food 0.537  0.165    0.74 
Education 0.035  0.053    0.96 
Health 0.103  0.137    1.13 
Ceremonies 0.031  0.065    1.20 
      
Prop. children in household in work  0.324  0.422  -0.27
 
Prop. children in household in school  0.518  0.445   0.25
 
Prop. households with at least 1 child in work  0.410  (0.492)  -0.11* 
Prop. households with at least 1 child in school  0.628  (0.483)   0.11* 
      
Expenditure in Rupees:     
Total expenditure per capita (m) 500.72  492.84   
Adult clothing & footwear (A1)   43.56   45.98   
Tea & coffee (A2)   17.65   15.77   
Tobacco (A3)   19.35   29.95   
Adult expend: aggregate of above three items (A4)  80.55   65.93   
Child clothing & footwear (C)   26.71   27.00   
      
      
 
Notes: N=1340 households. The figures in columns 1-2 are means and standard deviations of 
shares of total household expenditure. The elasticities in column 3 are obtained as θ  from simple 
regressions of the form lnXk=θ lnX+u, where Xk is normalised expenditure for each item in 
column 1 and X is total expenditure per capita. For the adult goods, the natural normalisation of 
expenditure is per adult. For child clothing and education, it is per child. For food, health and 
ceremonies, it is per household member. A * indicates marginal effects of the log of total 
expenditure per capita obtained from a probit with dependent variable defined as unity if at least 
one child in the household works (or attends school). Every reported elasticity is statistically 
significant. A substantial fraction of households report zero spending on tobacco, ceremonies, 
health and education. In these cases the expenditure elasticity is computed for the sub-sample of 
households that record positive expenditure. The means of rupee expenditure are used to calculate 
elasticities using the estimated coefficients in Table 3. 
 
  30Table 2 
Is Adult Consumption Sensitive to whether Children are in Work or School? 
Tests of differences in means 
            (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Adult Expenditure (per adult):  Difference: 
E0 - E1 
t-statistic    p<t:
HA: diff<0 
p>|t| 
HA: diff≠ 0 
p>t 
HA: diff>0 
Panel 1: [Child labour, L]       
Adult clothing and footwear (A1)    4.89   1.92  0.97  0.06*  0.03* 
Tea and coffee (A2)  -1.34          -1.53 0.06* 0.13 0.94
Tobacco (A3)  -2.95          -1.78 0.04* 0.08* 0.96
“Adult goods”: aggregate of the above (A4)            -0.62 -0.08 0.47 0.94 0.53
Tobacco: sub-sample with exp>0 (A3)  -0.91          -0.43 0.34 0.67 0.67
       
Panel 2: [Child schooling, H]       
Adult clothing and footwear (A1)            -5.18 -2.00 0.02* 0.05* 0.98
Tea and coffee (A2)    0.34    0.38  0.65  0.71  0.35 
Tobacco (A3)    0.32    0.19  0.58  0.85  0.42 
“Adult goods”: aggregate of the above (A4)            -18.62 -2.31 0.01* 0.02* 0.99
Tobacco: sub-sample with exp>0 (A3)    0.02    0.01  0.50  0.99  0.50 
       
Notes: The sample is divided into the 791 (41%) households in which at least one child aged 10-14 is reported as working in the reference week 
(group 1), and the remaining 549 (59%) households with no child labour (group 0). Column 1 reports the difference in adult expenditure between 
these two samples. A negative difference indicates that more is spent on adult consumption in the average household when children work- contrary 
to what is expected under altruism. Column 2 presents the t-statistic associated with this difference. The null hypothesis is that the difference is 
zero. The p-values in columns 3-5 indicate whether the difference is statistically significant for the 1-tailed and 2-tailed tests defined in terms of 
the alternative hypotheses, HA. The analysis is repeated in Panel 2 of the Table, with sub-samples defined as the 842 (63%) households in which at 
least one child attended school in the reference week, and the remaining 498 (37%) households. If schooling is a good, while child labour is a bad, 
the signs are now in reverse. A negative difference indicates that more is spent on adult consumption in the average household when children 
attend school- and this is consistent with altruism. All expenditures are in Rupees per adult to allow for differences across households in the 
number of adults. Since 30% of households exhibit zero expenditure on tobacco, t-tests are presented separately for the sub-sample of households 
that report positive tobacco expenditure. 
  31Table 3 
Child Schooling & Child Labour 
GMM & LIML Estimates of M-Demands 
 SCHOOLING (H)  Adult clothing Tea & Coffee  Tobacco 
(smokers) 
Adult goods 
Panel 1: GMM Estimates  (A1) (A2) (A3)  (A4) 
Adult expenditure (x10)  0.132** 0.606** 0.146*  0.084** 
  [0.034] [0.221] [0.064] [0.021] 
      
Hansen’s J χ
2; p-value  3.60; 0.17  0.90; 0.64  1.61; 0.45  2.67; 0.26 
1
st stage F on IV; p-value  8.65; 0.00  4.59; 0.01  6.42; 0.00  11.94; 0.00 
      
Panel 2: LIML Estimates      
Adult expenditure (x10)  0.154** 0.685** 0.171** 0.095** 
  [0.046] [0.259]]  [0.060] [0.026] 
LR test; 95% critical value   35.99; 5.41  40.21; 5.21  19.30; 4.56  37.03; 5.05 
Wald test; 95% critical value  12.50; 3.57  7.48; 2.82  8.24; 2.92  14.52; 3.53 
      
Panel 3: OLS Estimates      
Adult expenditure (x100)  0.096**  0.043  0.057  0.046* 
  [0.038]  [0.081]  [0.051]  [0.022] 
R-square  0.19  0.16  0.16  0.16 
      
CHILD LABOUR (L)      
Panel 1: GMM Estimates      
Adult expenditure (x10)  -0.059** -0.267*  -0.055+  -0.038** 
  [0.021] [0.131] [0.031] [0.013] 
      
Hansen J χ
2; p-value  1.65; 0.44  1.49; 0.48  1.04; 0.59  1.32; 0.52 
1
st stage F on IV; p-value  8.65; 0.00  4.59; 0.01  6.42; 0.00  11.94; 0.00 
      
Panel 2: LIML Estimates      
Adult expenditure (x10)  -0.060** -0.291** -0.076+  -0.039** 
  [0.026] [0.149] [0.041] [0.016] 
LR test; 95% critical value   7.13; 4.68  7.36; 5.20  4.23; 4.56  7.25; 4.37 
Wald test; 95% critical value  5.31; 3.36  3.77; 2.82  3.38; 2.90  5.57; 3.44 
      
Panel 3: OLS Estimates      
Adult expenditure (x10) -0.067**  0.035  -0.064  -0.029 
 [0.024]  [0.081]  [0.050]  [0.018] 
R-square 0.12  0.11  0.12  0.12 
N  1327 1327 927  1327 
Notes: The dependent variable is the proportion of children 10-14 years in the household that 
attend school and work respectively. See section 4.3 for details of the estimators and tests. Robust 
standard errors in brackets. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%.  
 
  32Table 4 
Do Children Get Less in Smoking Households (A3>0)? 
Tests of conditional mean differences 
 
  Schooling    Child  labour
Regression estimates     
tobacco expenditure  0.252**  -0.110* 
  [0.111]  [0.050] 
1(tobacco>0)  -0.744**  0.392* 
  [0.300]  [0.153] 
Hansen J χ
2; p-value  2.69; 0.26  1.05; 0.59 
1
st stage F on IV; p-value  3.31; 0.04  3.31; 0.04 
    
T-tests    
Difference: C0 - C1      0.22 -0.31
t-statistic      5.96 -21.0
p<t: HA: diff<0  1.00   0.00 
p>|t|: HA: diff≠ 0  0.00     0.00
p>t: HA: diff>0  0.00    1.00 
% change  -32.1  300.0 
 
Notes: the reference good is tobacco expenditure. This is similar to column 3 of Table 3 except that now all households are used and a dummy 
variable (DS) is defined which equals unity for the 927 (70%) households that report positive expenditures on tobacco and zero for the remaining 
400 (30%) households. So C = γ 3A3 + γ SDS + θ Z + e. Row 2 shows that γ S<0. The predicted level of C in a smoking household (DS=1) is C1= γ 3A3 
+ γ S + θ Z and the predicted C in a non-smoking household (DS=0) is C0= θ Z. The mean difference is (C0 - C1), reported with its t-statistic. The null 
hypothesis is that the difference is zero. The p-values indicate whether the difference is statistically significant for the 1-tailed and 2-tailed tests 




  33Table 5 
Investigating the Income Pooling Assumption 
 (C1/A1) ln(C1) 
    
Prop. of children in work (C3) -146.483 -1.925 
  [414.021] [1.110] 
Ln p.c.  expenditure  (x100)  -46.763 0.441 
[103.454] [0.313] 
    
Hansen J χ
2(6); p-value  4.56; 0.60  10.39; 0.11 
1
st stage F on IV; p-value  18.29; 0.00  17.30; 0.00 
 
Notes: Refer section 6 of the text. Also see notes to Table 3.  C1/A1=Expenditure on child 




Table 6  
Marshallian Demands 
Child school, H  Child labour, L Adult clothing, A1 
      
      
household expenditure p.c. (m)  0.0079** -0.0032* 0.044*** 
[0.0021] [0.0014]  [0.013] 
Hansen J χ
2(2); p-value  5.00; 0.082  2.12; 0.35  2.15; 0.34 
1
st stage F (IV); p-value  17.32; 0.00  17.32; 0.00  25.51; 0.00 
 
Notes: See Notes to Table 3, and sections 3.4 and 6 of the text. The coefficients in columns 1 and 
2 are multiplied by 10 (as they were in Table 3). These estimates imply that 
∂ H/∂ A1=(∂ H/∂ m)/(∂ A1/∂ m)=0.018, which is not significantly different from the coefficient of 
0.013 obtained from the m-demand in Table 3. Similarly, the ratio of the Marshallian demand 
coefficients in this Table implies ∂ L/∂ A1=-0.0073, which is not significantly different from the m-
demand coefficient of -0.0059 in Table 3. 
 
  34Table 7  
Alternative Specifications 
 Sub-sample 
with no child 
labour 
Control for adult 
labour (exog) 
Control for male 





Control for male 
and female adult 





Dependent variable: school (H)               
Adult clothing expenditure (A1)  0.108**            0.148** 0.144** 0.154** 0.131** 0.118** 0.486** 
  [0.037]              [0.044] [0.043] [0.031] [0.034] [0.039] [0.140]
Adult labour     -0.218**  -0.180     
   [0.079]  [0.333]     
Adult female labour     -0.118*  -0.498     
   [0.048]  [0.393]     
Adult male labour     -0.147*  0.254     
   [0.061]  [0.359]     
Hansen J χ
2; p-value  1.49; 0.47  0.29; 0.87  0.28; 0.87  8.23; 0.31  7.98; 0.24  3.28; 0.91  6.14; 0.06 
1
st stage F on IV; p-value  5.12; 0.01  7.63; 0.00  7.62; 0.00  6.85; 0.00  6.47; 0.00  4.76; 0.00  7.14; 0.00 
Wald test elasticity(γ )=1: χ
2(1); p-value            0.05; 0.82 
Dependent variable: child labour (L)               
Adult clothing expenditure (A1)    -0.057*          -0.053* -0.065** -0.056** -0.074** -0.296** 
[0.026] [0.022] [0.017] [0.021] [0.028] [0.091]
Adult labour     0.439**  0.415*     
   [0.048]  [0.192]     
Adult female labour     0.282**  0.371     
   [0.026]  [0.301]     
Adult male labour     0.101*  0.103     
   [0.039]  [0.235]     
Hansen J χ
2; p-value    0.19; 0.91  0.04; 0.98  11.10; 0.13  11.04; 0.09  4.62; 0.10  6.02; 0.05 
1
st stage F on IV; p-value    7.63; 0.00  7.62; 0.00  6.85; 0.00  6.47; 0.00  4.76; 0.00  7.14; 0.00 
Wald test elasticity(γ )=1: χ
2(1); p-value                0.10; 0.76
N  780            1324 1312 1324 1312 1318  
               
Notes: See Notes to Table 3, which presents the benchmark model. All estimates are GMM. The C-statistic that tests the additional restrictions implied by the 
instruments used for adult labour is 7.99 (p-value=0.24) in the schooling equation and 11.1 (p=0.11) in the child labour equation, which confirms that the 
instruments are valid. The estimated coefficients in the last column correspond to ∂ H (or ∂ L)/∂ logA and so the elasticities, ∂ logH/∂ logA (=0.94) and ∂ logL/∂ logA 
(=0.91), can be derived by dividing these coefficients by the mean of H (0.518) or L (0.324).The Wald tests are of the null that the elasticity is 1 (–1 in the case of 
child labour).  
  35Figure 1: Conditional Likelihood Ratio Test Statistics and Critical Values Adjusted 






















































































































































































































































































1. Adult clothing, 2. Tea & coffee, 3. Tobacco, 4. Aggregate of 1-3. Details in text
beta is coefficient on Aj*100
Moreira's LR Statistic




















































































































































































































































































































1. Adult clothing, 2. Tea & coffee, 3. Tobacco, 4. Aggregate of 1-3. Details in text
beta is coefficient on Aj*100
Moreira's LR Statistic
Child Labour
Notes: See Section 4.3 of the text. Beta is the (scaled) coefficient on the adult expenditure. The asymptotic 
critical value (CV) is the flat line (lr), the adjusted CV is the jagged line (lrcrit) and the confidence region is 
the region of the graph where the observed statistic (the smooth curve) lies below its critical value. 
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